The Biological Weapons Convention (BWC), despite being the primary international treaty against bioweapons, has critical weaknesses: minimal staffing, no verification mechanism, and reliance on voluntary compliance. Advances in synthetic biology make these gaps even riskier, as bad actors could exploit biotechnology more easily. One way to address this is by proposing a multi-faceted approach to strengthen the BWC without requiring full treaty reform.
The idea involves three complementary strategies targeting different vulnerabilities in the current system:
Existing efforts to strengthen biosecurity often rely on policy advocacy or voluntary reporting, lacking enforcement mechanisms. By combining financial incentives for whistleblowers with proactive monitoring and voluntary state-to-state agreements, this approach bypasses the slow-moving BWC bureaucracy while still improving oversight:
For example, scientists might flag unusual pathogen purchases, while bilateral agreements could allow neighboring countries to jointly inspect high-risk labs under agreed-upon terms.
Hours To Execute (basic)
Hours to Execute (full)
Estd No of Collaborators
Financial Potential
Impact Breadth
Impact Depth
Impact Positivity
Impact Duration
Uniqueness
Implementability
Plausibility
Replicability
Market Timing
Project Type
Research