Dual Use Research of Concern (DURC) presents a unique challenge where beneficial life sciences research could inadvertently be misused to threaten public health, agriculture, or security. Currently, there's no standardized global framework for managing these risks, leading to uneven regulations across countries. This gap becomes especially problematic as research collaborations span borders and technologies like synthetic biology advance rapidly. Existing assessments, such as the Global Health Security Index, often overlook low- and middle-income countries, leaving blind spots in understanding how DURC is governed worldwide. A comprehensive analysis of global DURC policies could help identify best practices and opportunities for international alignment.

A Global Approach to DURC Regulation

A systematic review comparing DURC regulations across countries could provide clarity on how different nations handle this challenge. One way to approach this would involve:

• Data Collection: Compiling publicly available policies from governments, organizations like the WHO or OECD, and academic literature.
• Analysis: Evaluating the scope, enforcement mechanisms, and transparency of different regulatory frameworks.
• Case Studies: Exploring how specific countries or regions regulate high-risk research areas, such as gain-of-function studies or AI-driven bioengineering.

This could build on existing datasets like the WHO’s Joint External Evaluations but would require additional research to fill gaps.

Who Stands to Benefit?

Several groups could find value in such an analysis:

• Policymakers could refine or adopt DURC policies based on best practices.
• Research institutions would benefit from clearer regulatory guidelines.
• Global health organizations could integrate insights into their programs.

Governments might balance innovation with security concerns, while researchers seek clarity without excessive bureaucracy. One possible incentive alignment could involve emphasizing non-binding recommendations that address shared interests like pandemic preparedness.

Turning Analysis into Action

An execution strategy might unfold in progressive phases:

1. Start with compiling DURC regulations from a representative sample of 10-15 countries.
2. Next, conduct deeper case studies on countries with divergent approaches (e.g., the US, EU, China, or South Africa).
3. Finally, engage stakeholders through workshops to refine findings into practical policy recommendations.

For transparency challenges, indirect indicators like funding patterns or collaborations with local experts could supplement missing data. Positioning the effort as a technical, non-partisan initiative focused on health security might help navigate political sensitivities.

Unlike existing tools like the Global Health Security Index, this approach would offer granular, actionable insights on DURC regulations globally rather than focusing narrowly on high-income countries. While the OECD’s Biosecurity Toolkit provides guidelines, this project could assess how different countries implement such recommendations in practice.