One way to address the inefficiency and politicization of fiscal policy could be to create an independent institution, similar to the Federal Reserve but focused on fiscal interventions. Fiscal policy often lags behind economic conditions due to legislative delays and partisan gridlock, which can worsen recessions or inflationary pressures. A technocratic body with the authority to adjust spending and taxation based on economic indicators could enable faster, evidence-based responses.
This institution could operate with a mandate to stabilize the economy—similar to the Fed’s focus on employment and inflation—but through fiscal tools. For example:
Decisions might be made by appointed experts with staggered terms to reduce political influence. The institution could start with limited powers, such as control over a discretionary stabilization fund, and expand its role over time.
Such an approach could benefit the public through faster recoveries, businesses through reduced uncertainty, and governments by depoliticizing tough decisions. However, challenges include:
Unlike advisory bodies like the Congressional Budget Office or European Fiscal Boards, this idea would grant actual decision-making power. It would also complement automatic stabilizers (e.g., unemployment insurance) by adding discretionary, targeted responses. Coordination with monetary policy, like the Fed’s interest rate adjustments, could be managed through regular communication and joint frameworks.
While the idea builds on existing concepts, its key innovation is merging technocratic expertise with operational authority—potentially filling a critical gap in macroeconomic management.
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